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Abstract
This study tests a model that links stakeholder pressure to the implementation 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and market performance. 
Stakeholder groups and competitors might exert pressure on companies 
to implement CSR, which could lead to positive effects on market 
performance. Using structural equation modeling (SEM), the authors find 
that stakeholders and competitors exert pressure differently. The effect 
of CSR implementation on market performance is moderated by market 
dynamism: It affects market performance more in dynamic environments. 
The authors discuss implications for both companies and stakeholders.
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Corporate social responsibility1 (CSR) has gone “mainstream” (Vlachos, 
Tsamakos, Vrechopoulos, & Avramidis, 2009) as a business imperative (Beh, 
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1994; Murray & Vogel, 1997) and research focus. Approximately 90% of 
Fortune 500 companies have initiated explicit CSR initiatives (Lee, 2008), 
various ranking systems attempt to identify the best corporate citizens 
(Corporate Responsibility Officer, 2009), and a vast body of research out-
lines CSR antecedents and impacts across business-related disciplines (de 
Bakker, Groenewegen, & Den Hond, 2005). Businesses thus face increasing 
pressure to act in a socially responsible manner or implement a CSR strategy 
(Mohr, Webb, & Harris, 2001; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001), especially from 
stakeholder groups, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
For example, after the release of “Slaughtering the Amazon” by the envi-
ronmental NGO Greenpeace, the “sportswear giant Nike Inc. announced . . . 
that it will stop using leather from cattle raised in Brazil’s Amazon rainforest” 
(Lehman, 2009, p. 1), followed quickly by “German sports goods maker 
Adidas [which] obliged its suppliers to stop using leather from Amazonia” 
(German Business Digest, 2009, p. 1). Stakeholders thus have direct influ-
ences on CSR implementation, as recent research focusing on environmen-
tally responsible company behavior demonstrates (Darnall, Henriques, & 
Sadorsky, 2010; Murillo-Luna, Garcés-Ayerbe, & Rivera-Torres, 2008).
On the basis of these observations, the authors pursue two main objec-
tives. First, we investigate whether different stakeholder groups, including 
media, nonprofit organizations (NPOs), and competitors, can push compa-
nies to implement CSR to different extents. Thus, our research differs from 
investigations of consumer resistance, such as boycotts as exemplars of pri-
vate politics (Baron, 2001). Second, we introduce market dynamism as a new 
moderating variable into the relationship between CSR implementation and 
market performance. So, the authors pursue the call for further research by 
Kassinis and Vafeas (2006, pp. 156-157) to determine whether “organizations 
facing greater stakeholder pressures . . . suffer a competitive disadvantage 
and underperform compared to organizations facing lower pressures?” To 
achieve these research objectives, the authors undertake a survey among 
managers of Swiss companies. Data are analyzed by structural equation mod-
eling (SEM) with partial least squares (PLS; Barclay, Higgins, & Thompson, 
1995) to gain insight into complex interrelations.
Conceptual Background and Hypotheses 
Development
Within the broader field of business and society, several frameworks or con-
cepts seem to be “in competition for preeminence” (Schwartz & Carroll, 
2008, p. 148), such as CSR, business ethics, stakeholder management, 
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sustainability, corporate citizenship, corporate social performance, and even 
corporate governance (de Bakker et al., 2005; Fassin & Van Rossem, 2009).
Although the relationship between CSR and stakeholder theory has been 
classified as “a natural fit” (Carroll, 1991), both concepts have to be distin-
guished from one another (Harrison, Bosse, & Phillips, 2010). Stakeholder 
theory holds that the firm is an open, flexible system or nexus of actors (i.e., 
stakeholders). Stakeholders are persons or groups that can affect or are affected 
by the pursuit of the firm’s objectives (Freeman, 1984; see Mitchell, Agle, & 
Wood, 1997, p. 858, for a chronological overview). These actors are motivated 
to participate in organizational activities and have various and sometimes 
incongruent interests (Basu & Palazzo, 2008; Donaldson & Preston, 1995). 
Therefore, organizational behavior reflects and can be predicted by the nature 
of its diverse stakeholders, the norms that they adopt to define right or wrong, 
and their relative influence on organizational decisions. The stakeholder per-
spective also requires the firm to balance different stakeholder interests in its 
decisions and actions (Freeman, 2005). In line with the strong empirical sup-
port for this premise (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999; Berman, Wicks, 
Kotha, & Jones, 1999), the authors suggest, similar to Maignan and Ferrell 
(2004, p. 5), “that CSR designates the duty (motivated by both instrumental 
and moral arguments) to meet or to exceed stakeholder norms dictating desir-
able organizational behaviors.” However, we also acknowledge the normative 
research perspective that states that regarding CSR as only a (social or stake-
holder) obligation fails to provide the normative criteria and ethical basis for 
evaluating CSR activities (e.g., Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995; 
Swanson, 1995). The current reemergence of stakeholder theory can be inter-
preted as a result of heightened interest in both ethically based theories and 
acquisition of competitive resources (Harrison et al., 2010).
Effect of Stakeholder Pressure on CSR Implementation
Some authors perceive the effects of stakeholder pressure on a company’s 
behavior as “relatively predictable” (Holzer, 2008, p. 62). Yet, few studies 
have investigated explicitly the effect of stakeholder pressure on CSR imple-
mentation. To the best of our knowledge, current research addresses stake-
holder pressures only for the case of environmental practices and performance 
(Cuesta González & Valor Martinez, 2004; Darnall et al., 2010; Kassinis & 
Vafeas, 2006; Murillo-Luna et al., 2008) or for a special type of CSR imple-
mentation, such as corporate giving (Brammer & Millington, 2004). These 
research attempts focus on partial aspects of CSR; the authors suggest a more 
holistic view.
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With respect to CSR, “talking” and “doing” have to be distinguished (den 
Hond, de Bakker, & Neergaard, 2007; Egels-Zandén & Sandberg, 2010). 
Earlier work in the CSR literature was dominantly investigating the “talking” 
in terms of CSR strategy, and to a lesser extent, the “doing” (Lindgreen, 
Swaen, & Maon, 2009). To express their focus on actual behavior, recent 
publications have invented the terms “corporate social action” (Marquis, 
Glynn, & Davis, 2007, 926) or “corporate social change activities” (den 
Hond & de Bakker, 2007, p. 901). In this article, the authors stick to the term 
“CSR implementation” (e.g., Lindgreen et al., 2009) instead, since it is able 
to express the managerial perspective of how to put a certain CSR strategy 
into practice.
In line with Fassin (2009) and Kassinis and Vafeas (2006), the authors 
define stakeholder pressure as the ability and capacity of stakeholders to 
affect an organization by influencing its organizational decisions. The ability 
to exercise pressure depends on several antecedents such as country-specific 
characteristics (Doh & Guay, 2006). Furthermore, it has been revealed that 
power, legitimacy, and urgency play a prominent role determining the stake-
holder salience of companies—measured as the perceived managerial prior-
ity and importance and the degree of time and attention (Agle et al., 1999; 
Mitchell et al., 1997). Without neglecting the relevance of these three attri-
butes as predecessors, our study is focusing on the broader relationship from 
perceived pressure through different groups—regardless of their legitimacy, 
power and urgency—on CSR implementation as concrete corporate action.
To conduct an empirical investigation of stakeholder pressure, we must 
first identify the relevant actors. With respect to stakeholder pressure, prior 
approaches were focusing on pressure by activist groups (Fassin, 2009) or 
social movement organizations (Campbell, 2006; Holzer, 2008). The pres-
ent authors conceptualize stakeholder pressure more broadly since they aim 
at capturing effects of stakeholder pressure on the implementation of CSR, 
not on financial performance (see Berman et al., 1999). Given the above-
mentioned critical aspects of too broad typologies, the authors adopt the 
classification into primary and secondary stakeholders established by 
Clarkson (1995). This largely accepted typology basically relies on the 
observation that stakeholders can influence organizational behavior “via 
direct pressure or by conveying information” (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999, 
p. 89). Primary stakeholders (shareholders and investors, employees, cus-
tomers, government) are essential for the survival of the company; second-
ary stakeholders (media, nonprofits) influence public opinion and thus can
damage or enhance a company’s reputation (Clarkson, 1995; Eesley &
Lenox, 2006; Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009; Harrison et al., 2010).
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This approach also matches resource dependence theory, which states that 
“an organization must attend to the demands of those in its environment 
that provide resources necessary and important for its continued survival” 
(Frooman, 1999; Pfeffer, 1982, p. 193).
Following Clarkson’s (1995) typology, the authors hypothesize that pri-
mary stakeholders influence CSR implementation more than do secondary 
stakeholders. Drawing from institutional theory (Campbell, 2007), secondary 
stakeholders could have a direct impact on CSR implementation (e.g., 
Greenpeace and Amazonian leather suppliers or the example of Shell, see 
Schepers, 2006), which often depends on the NGO’s own self-perception 
(Arenas, Lozano, & Albareda, 2009). In this sense, the secondary stakeholder 
group of NGOs comprises also “stakeseekers,” which are defined as social 
movement organizations claiming new stakes without organizationally 
defined links (Holzer, 2008, p. 52). Furthermore, secondary stakeholders 
exert indirect impacts by influencing primary stakeholders, usually through 
the provision of information or by setting social agendas, such as through 
mass media (Campbell, 2007; McCombs & Shaw, 1972).
The authors therefore hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Pressure from primary stakeholders relates positively to 
CSR implementation.
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Pressure from secondary stakeholders relates posi-
tively to CSR implementation but less so than does pressure from primary 
stakeholders.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Pressure from secondary stakeholders relates posi-
tively to pressure from primary stakeholders.
Effects of Competitive Pressure on CSR Implementation
In market economies, competitors vie for resources. This competition results 
in pressures to innovate, enhance products and services, and expand into new 
markets. The authors conceptualize competitive CSR implementation pres-
sures by focusing on the impact of competition on CSR implementation 
through the lens of institutional theory (Campbell, 2007). That is, competi-
tors often constitute the “forgotten stakeholders” (Spence, Coles, & Harris, 
2001, p. 331), in both stakeholder theory (Fassin, 2009; Freeman, 1984) and 
CSR conceptualizations. Against this background, the authors conceptualize 
competitors as a group of nonstakeholders, who are able to exert CSR imple-
mentation pressure.
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The potential influence of competitors on CSR implementation is twofold. 
First, the concept of CSR itself could change from a social or stakeholder 
obligation to a business obligation, which alters the entire competitive envi-
ronment. In turn, CSR activities in the firm’s competitive environment may 
produce direct pressures to implement CSR, especially if CSR implementa-
tion represents a competitive positioning tactic (Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 
2007; Maignan, Ferrell, & Hult, 1999). In fact, Christmann (2004, p. 749) 
states that “industry pressures for environmental responsibility can also result 
from competitors’ actions. Firms aim to enhance their legitimacy by imitating 
successful competitors.” This observation can be explained by institutional 
theory as the preconscious acceptance of institutionalized practices (Oliver, 
1991). Mimetic isomorphism in this regard can even be identified in the early 
20th century among nationally organized business associations (Campbell, 
2006, 2007; Oliver, 1991).
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): Competitive CSR implementation pressure relates pos-
itively to CSR implementation.
Second, companies undertake both competitive and cooperative relation-
ships with their competitors, in which case a competitive obligation may 
arise. For example, in Europe, industry associations that include many com-
petitors often mandate CSR initiatives (Matten & Moon, 2008). In response 
to CSR rankings, companies have begun enforcing CSR activities to achieve 
a better position (Adam & Shavit, 2008; Fassin & Van Rossem, 2009) and 
thereby attract consumers who prefer to purchase from the most socially 
responsible firms (Barnett, 2007). Thus, competitors could influence primary 
stakeholders and cause them to demand CSR implementation efforts.
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): Competitive CSR implementation pressure relates pos-
itively to pressure from primary stakeholders.
Moderating Role of Market Dynamism
Several systematic literature reviews and meta-analyses (Griffin & Mahon, 
1997; Margolis & Walsh, 2001; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; Roman, 
Hayibor, & Agle, 1999) reveal the vast variety of empirical findings regard-
ing the relationship between CSR implementation and market performance. 
This fact prompts us to focus not on financial performance in a narrow sense 
but rather on introducing a moderator; thus, we follow the call to introduce 
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more moderating variables into the relationship between CSR and perfor-
mance (Orlitzky et al., 2003).
The authors expect CSR and market performance to be positively related. 
By using market performance, we wish to investigate not the impact of CSR 
implementation on pure financial measures. Instead, market performance is 
focusing on the ability of a company to increase its market share and to attract 
and retain new customers. Through the simultaneous coordination and priori-
tization of multilateral stakeholder interests, managers can increase the effi-
ciency of their organization’s adaptation to external demands. Furthermore, 
CSR implementation leads to reciprocal, bilateral stakeholder–managerial 
relationships, which provide monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that 
prevent managers from diverting attention away from broad organizational 
performance goals. This line of argumentation is also known as the “good 
management” explanation (Waddock & Graves, 1997). In line with stake-
holder theory, the authors hypothesize that CSR implementation affects mar-
ket performance positively (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Maignan et al., 
1999; Waddock & Graves, 1997). By contrast, slack resource theory proposes 
a reverse relationship from financial performance to CSR, such that stronger 
performance creates slack resources that can support CSR (Seifert, Morris, & 
Bartkus, 2004; Waddock & Graves, 1997).
Environmental contingency theory considers complexity, rate of change, 
and uncertainty to influence organizations to a large extent (Hatch & 
Cuncliffe, 2006; Pennings, 1975). Consequently, performance consequences 
of socially responsible behavior are expected to vary across different envi-
ronments (Goll & Rasheed, 2004). Recent research proposes market dyna-
mism as a moderating variable into relationships between organizational 
characteristics or strategies and performance (e.g., Homburg & Pflesser, 
2000; Hult, Ketchen, & Arrfelt, 2007; Jaworski & Kohli, 1993; Lichtenthaler, 
2009; Slater & Narver, 1994). Based on empirical results on philanthropic 
giving (Goll & Rasheed, 2004), the authors consider market dynamism as a 
moderator between CSR implementation and performance.
In general terms, market dynamism can be distinguished into instability 
and turbulence and refers generally to unpredictable change (Dess & Beard, 
1984; Goll & Rasheed, 2004; Lumpkin & Dess, 2001; Rasheed & Prescot, 
1992). The moderating effect can be explained as follows: In dynamic mar-
kets, companies implement CSR anticipating to create legitimacy among 
stakeholders (Goll & Rasheed, 2004). In this regard, CSR implementation 
that is responding to stakeholder pressure could be interpreted as organiza-
tional routines acquiring resources, interpretable as “dynamic capabilities” 
(Garriga & Melé, 2004, p. 54). Since stakeholder management means to 
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Figure 1. Theoretical model.
adapt to dynamic forces exerted by stakeholders, firms responsive to stake-
holder are expected to have the capability to respond also to market dyna-
mism (Harrison et al., 2010) and also to recover quickly from inferior 
performance (Choi & Wang, 2009). As a result, in a market marked by strong 
dynamism, a company should be rewarded for its responsiveness, because it 
can attract and retain more stakeholders. Therefore, the authors expect the 
relationship between CSR implementation and market performance to be 
moderated by market dynamism.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Stronger market dynamism enhances the positive rela-
tionship between CSR implementation and market performance.
The theoretical model for our research, in Figure 1, contains six hypothe-
ses that the authors derive most dominantly from three theoretical 
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backgrounds—stakeholder theory, institutional theory, and environmental 
contingency theory—all of which do at least partly draw from resource 
dependence theory.
Methods
Sample and Data Sources
To collect the data, the authors distributed a survey questionnaire to 1,000 top 
managers of medium-sized and large industrial firms in Switzerland.2 As 
stakeholders “vary more between industries than between firms within an 
industry” (Godfrey, Hatch, & Hansen, 2010, p. 323), a cross-industry 
approach is chosen. The companies in the sample represent the structure of 
the Swiss economy quite well, both in terms of type of industry and in num-
ber of employees, turnover, and profitability. We obtained 196 usable 
responses, for a response rate of 19.6%. The comparison of early and late 
respondents suggests nonresponse bias is not an issue for our data (p < .5; 
Armstrong & Overton, 1977). The extensiveness of our survey and the high 
managerial level targeted suggest this response rate is acceptable, compared 
with rates reported in prior studies of complex organizational phenomena 
(e.g.; Harzing, 1997).
To obtain data from self-reports is not generally inferior to objective data 
(Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986). Furthermore, objective data for our con-
structs are not available for European countries (see Kacperczyk, 2009). 
Information on CSR activities published in popular media also cannot be taken 
as pure objective data because it may reflect marketing or public relations 
attempts. Instead, the measures in our survey rely on perceived constructs 
obtained from informants (Maignan & Ferrell, 2000), who should have a com-
prehensive view of their organization because of their specialized knowledge 
or position (Bagozzi & Yi, 1991). Thus, the authors obtain coherent informa-
tion without any camouflage that might arise from using data provided to spe-
cial stakeholder groups (e.g., managers could underestimate the costs of 
communicating CSR to shareholders and overestimate it for nonprofit groups; 
Ullmann, 1985). However, we also confront potential measurement error in the 
form of the so-called key informant bias; key informants may report an indi-
vidual, coherent view of the organization that has been influenced systemati-
cally by their experiences, which could result in systematic errors and weakened 
construct validity (Bagozzi & Yi, 1991). In the current sample, several mea-
sures revealed high competency levels for all informants.3
Besides key informant bias, the authors are aware of the potential discrep-
ancy between true and observed relationships between constructs resulting 
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from common method variance (Doty & Glick, 1998). Among the sources of 
common method bias, common rater effects could occur if both independent 
and dependent variables come from the same source, based on social desir-
ability in the sense of strategy-induced response behavior or consistency 
motifs (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003; Podsakoff & Organ, 
1986). To avoid this bias, the authors established three different procedures 
both during the scale development phase and during data analysis.
Firstly, we followed standard scale development techniques to limit poten-
tial misunderstandings, social desirability, and item ambiguity (Podsakoff 
et al., 2003). Through extensive validity tests of the new scales with 20 
experts, we investigated whether each item was unambiguous, answerable, 
and related to the indicated construct. We adjusted items as necessary and 
then conducted a pretest of the questionnaire with 20 additional respondents 
(17 managers from 12 different industries plus three academics) using think-
aloud techniques (Dillman & Redline, 2004). We made small changes in the 
wording of several items and the instructions.
Second, after gathering the data from the questionnaires, the authors 
adopted those techniques applicable to our case to test for potential common 
method bias (Doty & Glick, 1998; Podsakoff et al., 2003; Spector, 2006). 
Harman’s one-factor test did not result in a single factor (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). Because some other techniques do not apply to PLS analyses such as 
ours (Liang, Saraf, Qing, & Yajiong, 2007; Pavlou, Liang, & Xue, 2007), the 
authors determined whether a method variance marker, namely, CSR strat-
egy, was theoretically unrelated or weakly related to at least one other vari-
able (Lindell & Whitney, 2001; Malhotra, Kim, & Patil, 2006). The marker 
variable contained items such as, “In our company, the CSR concept is the 
leading principle of our overall business strategy.” That variable had only a 
weak influence on two items pertaining to the importance of CSR implemen-
tation for investors and employees; no other variables were affected by it.
Third, the authors collected financial performance data from the Amadeus 
database for a subsample of 20 companies. Out of the broad range of poten-
tial accounting and market-based measures of financial performance (Berman 
et al., 1999; Brammer & Millington, 2008; Choi & Wang, 2009; Griffin & 
Mahon, 1997; Margolis & Walsh, 2001), the authors chose a relative account-
ing measure, the profit margin. Based on information available in the data-
base, we calculated the average operating profit margin for the years 
2004-2006 and compared this result with the information obtained in the 
questionnaire from key informants to assess for a potential bias. Correlation 
analysis shows that the margins indicated by the survey participants and the 
margins obtained from the external source are highly correlated (Spearman’s 
rank correlation coefficient: .71, p < .02).
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To sum up, given scale development, the nonsignificant effect of a marker 
variable and the high correlation of questionnaire information with objective, 
external data substantiate our claim that the data is free of any bias.
Measurement Development and Assessment
For three constructs degree of CSR implementation, market performance, 
and market dynamism, the authors used multiitem scales from previous 
research. For stakeholder and competitive CSR implementation pressure, we 
developed two new scales with items based on conceptual definitions and 
relevant literature, which combine reflective and formative indicators. Our 
distinction of the formative and reflective measurement models follows sug-
gestions in prior literature (Jarvis, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2003) to avoid 
misspecifications (Albers, 2010), which also requires different criteria to 
evaluate the measures (Chin, 1998).
For reflective constructs, the authors assess individual item reliability by 
examining the (factor) loading of each indicator on its construct and 
Cronbach’s alpha for internal consistency reliability (Nunnally, 1978), which 
is included in Table 1 for all constructs. Composite reliability (Chin, 1998) is 
particularly appropriate for PLS analyses. Average variance extracted (AVE) 
provides an indicator of convergent validity and should be greater than 50%. 
For discriminant validity, the correlation of an indicator with its latent vari-
able should be higher than its correlations with all other latent variables 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981).
For formative constructs, the weights and significance instead reveal the 
relative importance of each indicator for the formation of the component. 
Weights can be interpreted similarly to multiple regression analysis, such that 
values near 1 or −1 have a strong influence, whereas those near 0 have little 
influence. Indicators that explain less than 1% of the latent variable’s vari-
ance, with a weight below 0.1, should be eliminated (Seltin & Keeves, 1994), 
unless a strong theoretical reason exists to retain them. As a check for multi-
collinearity, the variance inflation factors (VIF) should be lower than 10 
(Chatterjee & Hadi, 2006).
Stakeholder and competitive CSR implementation pressure. Previous studies 
have not included all relevant stakeholder groups, which represented a short-
coming (e.g., Maignan et al., 1999). Others focus only on primary stakehold-
ers being “most closely associated with the firm’s operations or objectives” 
(Harrison et al., 2010, p. 60). The authors explicitly aim at capturing the 
effects of both primary and secondary stakeholders. Based on prior literature 
(Clarkson, 1995; Yau et al., 2007), we operationalized pressure from primary 
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Table 1. Correlations.
Constructs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Government .70
2. Media .16* .91
3.  Costumers/
investors
.10 .24** .74
4. Competitors .22** .37** .31** .88
5. Employees .24** .34** .47** .29** .87
6.  NGO/activists .14* .40** .22** .32** .28** .72
7.  Market 
performance
.03 .14 .20** .05 .22** –.07 .88
8.  Market dynamism .08 .16*  .18* .24** .07 .11 .03 .80
9.  CSR 
implementation
.21** .32** .36**  .17* .61** .15* .45** .15* —
Notes: CSR = corporate social responsibility; Pearson’s correlation coefficient; two-tailed tests. Cronbach’s 
alphas on the diagonal.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
and secondary stakeholders as second-order constructs. They consist of com-
ponents measured with reflective items that are themselves formative mea-
sures of the second-order constructs (Jarvis et al., 2003). In contrast to recent 
research, the items do not capture the perceived importance of stakeholder 
pressures (“How important do you consider each of the following influences 
on your environmental practices?” Darnall et al., 2010, p. 1080; Murillo-
Luna et al., 2008) but the amount of perceived pressure.
Pressure from primary stakeholders comprises customers (two items), 
investors (two items), government (three items), and employees (three items; 
Clarkson, 1995). Exploratory factor analysis revealed that customers (sample 
item, “Our customers are ready to boycott products and services which do not 
comply with social standards”) and investors (sample item, “Social and/or 
ecological aspects of investments are important for our investors”) should be 
conceptualized as one component instead of two (composite reliability = .83, 
AVE = 54.84%). Factor loadings and reliability measures are high enough 
also for employees (sample item, “Our employees expect the firm to imple-
ment CSR activities”; composite reliability = .92, AVE = 79.88%) and for 
government (sample item “Governments force initiatives to increase trans-
parency in our business”; composite reliability = .82, AVE = 63.74%).
Pressure from secondary stakeholders consists of (a) media and (b) NPOs 
and activists that work “on behalf of others who lack the voice or access to 
promote their interests” (Doh, 2008, p. 275; see also Clarkson, 1995). Forms 
12
of shareholder activism (e.g., den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Wen, 2009) are 
not included in this dimension of the construct. Four items were used to mea-
sure pressure from media such as, “Our company’s activities are closely 
monitored by the media” (composite reliability = .94, AVE = 79.96%). For 
NGO/activists, three items were applied, such as, “We foster partnerships 
with NGOs relevant to our company.” The factor loadings are high enough to 
support individual item reliability, with one exception (i.e., “We  have to cope 
with NGOs campaigning against our firm/our products and services”; factor 
loading = 0.45). The resulting scale with two items shows acceptable reli-
ability (composite reliability = .85, AVE = 74.17%).
In support of discriminant validity, the AVE of each component of pressure 
from primary stakeholders and secondary stakeholders is greater than the 
squared correlations between the latent variable and all other latent variables. 
Thus, our conceptualization of the stakeholder groups appears appropriate.
The scale for competitive CSR implementation pressure consists of four 
items such as “Our strongest competitors take a leading role in corporate 
social responsibility” (composite reliability = .92, AVE = 73.72%).
In Appendix Table A1, A2, and A3, the authors provide overviews of the 
items, means, standard deviations, and quality criteria for primary stakehold-
ers, secondary stakeholders, and competitors, respectively.
CSR implementation. Measuring the degree of CSR implementation in a 
company is very complex and difficult. The content validity of any mea-
sure depends on the definition and application of CSR (Mattingly & Berman, 
2006). In our study, the objective is to investigate stakeholders’ pressure on 
CSR implementation based on managerial perceptions; consequently, the 
outcome variable should be measured broadly but from a managerial per-
spective (Schwartz & Carroll, 2008). By not relying on CSR databases, our 
measurement approach is able to capture not “corporate ‘talk’ behavior” but 
actual behavior (Egels-Zandén & Sandberg, 2010, p. 39). Therefore, the 
authors combine the items used for the four-dimensional Corporate Citizen-
ship Scale (Maignan et al., 1999), which builds on Carroll’s CSR pyramid 
(Carroll, 1979) and the approach to build an index such as those used by vari-
ous CSR rankings (e.g., Corporate Responsibility Officer, 2009).
The authors adopt most of the items on economic citizenship, legal citi-
zenship, ethical citizenship, and discretionary citizenship (Küskü & Zarkada-
Fraser, 2004; Maignan & Ferrell, 2000, 2001) and also introduce additional 
items. Sample items for the dimensions philanthropic responsibilities (seven 
items), ethical responsibilities (seven items), legal responsibilities (four 
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items), economic responsibilities (four items) are: “Our top management 
ensures a coherent corporate citizenship approach integrated into the corpo-
rate strategy.” “Our top management reports in accordance with international 
reporting standards (e.g., Global Reporting Initiative [GRI]).” “We have pro-
grams that encourage the diversity of our workforce (e.g., age, sex, handi-
capped).” “We have a standardized procedure in place to respond to every 
customer complaint.” The authors provide the descriptive measures of the 
items in Appendix Table A4.
As outlined by Franke, Preacher, and Rigdon (2008), a formative specifi-
cation of CSR implementation is more appropriate for the items developed by 
Maignan et al. (1999). The analysis of the formative measurement model 
reveals some multicollinearity; the VIF of the items did not exceed the criti-
cal value of 10, and most were greater than 2. This finding is particularly 
problematic for our study scenario, which features SEM, formative measure-
ments, and a small sample size (Grewal, Cote, & Baumgartner, 2004) and 
implies negative effects on the stability of the indicator coefficients (Fornell 
& Bookstein, 1982). We therefore combined our items to an index to avoid 
multicollinearity problems (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001).
Several indexes measuring CSR implementation have already been estab-
lished, out of which the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) Social Rating 
is the most prominent one for U.S. companies (Chatterji, Levine, & Toffel, 
2009; Kacperczyk, 2009; Mattingly & Berman, 2006). Since the KLD rating 
is based on dichotomous variables (Chatterji et al., 2009), the subcategories 
can easily be aggregated (Hull & Rothenberg, 2008) or weighted and aggre-
gated (Waddock & Graves, 1997) to generate a score for each company.
Following this methodological approach, the authors built a nonweighted 
index of 22 items. Because a multiplication approach to our Likert-type scale 
would produce 10% missing values in the index and very high index scores 
(up to quintillions), we used an additive index, which ignores missing values 
and subtracts the lowest scale level for all 22 items (i.e., index score = 22). 
The index contains values from 22 to 132, and the company with the lowest 
possible index would “strongly disagree” with all items, whereas the com-
pany with the highest possible index would “strongly agree.” This approach 
avoids normative weighting and thus allows companies to react on stake-
holder pressures with a broad range of CSR activities (what Hull & 
Rothenberg, 2008, p. 785, call the “catholic nature” of their index).
Market performance. As Menon, Bharadwaj, and Howell (1996) point 
out, perceptual measures of performance are not generally inferior to objec-
tive performance measures if they include competitive comparisons. They 
suggest market share, market share gains, net profit, and sales growth rate 
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as viable measures. Broadening the definition and measurement of per-
formance is perceived as beneficial for understanding the interrelations 
between strategy, performance, and stakeholder management (Berman et 
al., 1999). However, to measure market performance, the authors turn to 
Homburg, Workman, and Jensen’s (2002) reflective scale, which integrates 
comparisons with competitors and customers as a central stakeholder group 
(see also Yau et al., 2007). The question asked is, “Compared to your com-
petitors, how has your organization, over the last three years, performed 
with respect to. . .” for example “ . . . securing desired market share” as one 
of seven items (anchors 1 = very poor, 7 = excellent). Appendix Table A5 
lists the items used. The results demonstrate the suitability of the scale: All 
the item loadings are above 0.75, the AVE (59.04%) is above the threshold, 
and composite reliability is .91.
Market dynamism. A few studies tried to conceptualize market dynamism 
as a two-dimensional construct of instability and turbulence using statistical 
data (e.g., the percentage of scientists and engineers among all employees; 
Dess & Beard, 1984; Goll & Rasheed, 2004; Rasheed & Prescot, 1992). 
Given that most of these indicators capture also organizational reactions 
to market dynamism, the authors rely on those conceptualizations that per-
ceive market dynamism as the rate of change in the composition of custom-
ers and their preferences (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993; Kessler & Chakrabarti, 
1996). This approach is line with most recent environmental contingency 
approaches acknowledging the information perspective on uncertainty 
(Hatch & Cuncliffe, 2006). Consequently, we measure market dynamism 
with a previously established scale (Homburg & Pflesser, 2000; Jaworski 
& Kohli, 1993; Maltz & Kohli, 1996). Since the AVE is too low (37.90%), 
and two items exhibit factor loadings below the required level, we use only 
three items (“In our kind of business, customers’ product preferences change 
quickly.” “Our customers tend to look for new products all the time.” “New 
customers tend to have product-related needs that are different from those 
of our existing customers.”).4 The factor loadings of the adapted scale with 
three items are above 0.71, composite reliability is .86, and AVE 68.39%. 
The authors list the items along with relevant scale validity and reliability 
criteria in Appendix Table A6.
Analytical Procedures
To examine the proposed relationships among our latent variables, the authors 
chose PLS. Although PLS is well established in marketing research, other 
disciplines remain in the process of adopting it. SEM in general is adequate 
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for assessing and furthering theoretical models through empirical research 
(Anderson & Gerbing, 1988) and appears widely in both marketing research 
(Jarvis et al., 2003) and strategic management research. Specifically, PLS is 
based on the regression principle of using ordinary least squares (OLS) to 
explain variance and can test complex models with both formative and reflec-
tive items (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Fornell & Bookstein, 1982; Wold, 
1980). The determinant nature of the PLS approach avoids parameter identi-
fication problems that can occur with covariance-based analysis (Bollen, 
1989). Furthermore, unlike LISREL or AMOS, PLS is a distribution-free 
method with fewer constraints that is suitable for relatively small samples. 
However, PLS lacks an overall test of model fit (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988), 
so assessments of the measurement model must be separate from assessments 
of the structural model (Fornell & Cha, 1994).
Results
To estimate the SEM, the authors used SmartPLS 2.0 (beta; Ringle, Wende, 
& Will, 2005). We relied on several criteria, for both endogenous and exog-
enous constructs, to assess the quality of the structural model. The path coef-
ficients may range from 0 to 1 and can be interpreted similarly to standardized 
beta coefficients in a regression analysis. To test for statistical significance, 
we used a bootstrapping procedure with 500 subsamples (df = 499), which is 
superior to concurrent jackknifing resampling because of its lower standard 
errors (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993). Bootstrapping delivers t values compara-
ble to the theoretical t value of a two-sided hypothesis test at a certain signifi-
cance (t > 1.65 for p < .10).
The pressure from primary stakeholders construct contains one formative 
indicator with a very low weight and lack of significance; government has 
low relevance in this case. The authors did not eliminate it though because we 
aim to develop a comprehensive measurement scale, and this indicator might 
be of greater importance in another environment. In Table 1, we provide an 
overview of correlations across constructs, and in Table 2, we list the hypoth-
eses with their respective t values, statistical significance, and effect sizes.
The R2 values of the two endogenous constructs indicate a moderate level 
of explained variance, specifically, pressure from primary stakeholders (R² = 
.34) and degree of CSR implementation (R² = .38). The market performance 
construct is weaker (R² = .23), perhaps because market performance does not 
improve directly or dominantly due to CSR implementation but rather is gen-
erated by high-quality products, financing, and so on.
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Table 2. Path coefficients from partial least squares (PLS) analyses.
Hypothesis Path
Path 
coefficient t value
Statistical 
significance
Effect 
size f²
1 (supported) Pressure from primary 
stakeholders → CSR 
implementation
.58 8.91 <.001 .35a
2a  (not 
supported)
Pressure from secondary 
stakeholders → CSR 
implementation
.09 1.25 ns .01
2b (supported) Pressure from secondary 
stakeholders → 
Pressure from primary 
stakeholders
.51 8.87 < .001 .31b
3a  (not 
supported)
Competitive CSR 
implementation pressure 
→ CSR implementation
–.06 0.96 ns .01
3b (supported) Competitive CSR 
implementation pressure 
→ Pressure from
primary stakeholders
.15 2.10 <.05 .02c
4 (supported) CSR implementation 
× Market dynamism → 
Market performance
.16 2.12 <.05 .03c
Market dynamism → 
Market performance
.02 0.13 ns
Note: R², pressure from primary stakeholders = .34; R², corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
implementation = .38; R², market performance = .23.
aLarge effect size.
bMedium effect size.
cSmall effect size.
A Stone–Geisser test using a nonparametric test criterion (Q²) and a blind-
folding procedure can assess the predictive relevance of the construct for 
values above 0 (Fornell & Bookstein, 1982; Fornell & Cha, 1994; Henseler, 
Ringle, & Sinkovics, 2009). In our case, all endogenous constructs attain 
predictive relevance (pressure from primary stakeholders, Q² = 0.15; CSR 
implementation, Q² = 0.32; market performance, Q² = 0.11).
The empirical results support H1, which predicts that pressure from pri-
mary stakeholders increases CSR implementation. The path coefficient 
between the constructs (β = .58) is significant at the .001 level. Thus, stake-
holder pressure from employees, customers, investors, and government 
encourages companies to implement CSR activities.
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With regard to H2, pertaining to pressure from secondary stakeholders, we 
must reject H2a because the path coefficient from pressure from secondary 
stakeholders to CSR implementation (β = .09) is very weak and insignificant. 
In contrast, the indirect effect of pressure from secondary stakeholders on 
pressure from primary stakeholders is supported (β = .51) at the .001 level, in 
support of H2b. Similarly, competitive CSR implementation pressures have 
an effect on pressure from primary stakeholders (β = .15) on the .05 level, in 
support of H3b. However, the direct relationship from competitive CSR 
implementation pressure (β = −.06) is not significant, which contradicts H3a.
Finally, in H4, we predict that stronger market dynamism enhances the 
relationship between CSR implementation and market performance. To test 
this moderating effect, we first note that the path coefficient (β = .02) of the 
direct relationship between market dynamism and market performance is not 
significant. The moderating effect can be confirmed (β = .16) at the .05 level. 
We find that CSR implementation is more important in environments with 
dynamism, in support of H4. In addition, CSR implementation relates posi-
tively to market performance with a path coefficient (β = .42) that is signifi-
cant at the .001 level.
An effect size suitable for multiple regressions must be available to assess 
the impact of an exogenous latent variable on an endogenous latent variable 
(Fern & Monroe, 1996). The effect size can be classified into three levels: 
weak (f² = .02), moderate (f² = .15), and substantial (f² = .35; Chin, 1998). 
Pressure from primary stakeholders has a large effect on CSR implementa-
tion (f² = .35), whereas pressure from secondary stakeholders has a medium-
sized effect on pressure from primary stakeholders (f² = .31), as does CSR 
implementation on market performance (f² = .20).
Given these results, companies might request managerial implications in 
such a way that the responsiveness to high pressure via high CSR implemen-
tation leads to higher market performance. Thus, a final step in the analysis 
considers a descriptive overview on overall pressure, CSR implementation 
and market performance (inspired by Brammer & Millington, 2008). The 
authors built two additive indexes, one for overall pressure (consisting of all 
24 items stemming from the three pressure-related constructs) and one for 
market performance (based on its seven items). For both, we ignore missing 
values. Index values are split up into above average (high) and below average 
(low), resulting in a 2 x 2 matrix depicted in Table 3.
Descriptive results show that two combinations lead to a market perfor-
mance that is above average (M = 31.88): high overall pressure and high CSR 
implementation as well as low pressure and high CSR implementation. At the 
same time, companies with low CSR implementation perform less well if 
they perceive high or low overall pressure.
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Table 3. Market performance depending on degrees of overall pressure and 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) implementation.
Overall pressure
High Low
CSR implementation
 High 33.84 (n = 64) 33.08 (n = 40)
 Low 29.81 (n = 21) 29.89 (n = 65)
Note: n = 190 (firms that have not answered the questions on market performance have been 
excluded from this analysis).
Discussion
Contribution and Implications
As a theoretical contribution, this study hypothesizes the effects of stake-
holder pressure and competitive pressure on CSR implementation. The study 
contributes by finding tentative support of the proposed causal chain in which 
environmental factors lead to stronger CSR implementation, which—moder-
ated by market dynamism—leads to better market performance. The empiri-
cal findings also suggest some key conclusions. In particular, we confirm that 
stakeholders influence CSR implementation. Thus, we support the perspec-
tive that regards CSR as a stakeholder obligation. As revealed by prior stud-
ies among opinion leaders, CSR and the stakeholder concept appear to 
“reinforce each other” (Fassin & Van Rossem, 2009, p. 583) in a complemen-
tary way (Hillman & Keim, 2001, p. 135).
More specifically, our study reveals that pressure from primary stakehold-
ers exerts a strong impact on CSR implementation. The stakeholders with the 
strongest influence on the pressure exerted by primary stakeholders are 
employees. Firm activities are always carefully observed by their employees. 
Therefore, acting in a socially responsible manner could be a source of com-
petitive advantage with regard to the role of employees in the firm (e.g., posi-
tive word of mouth, employee loyalty, and retention). Employees were key 
topics in European CSR discussions in the 1970s; they should be subject to 
stakeholder research again.
The primary stakeholders with the second largest impact on perceived 
pressure are customers and investors, who should be considered as one group 
in our data set. This result shows the strong linkage markets are establishing 
between customers and investors, which might even result in multiple roles 
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individuals may exert (Sen, Bhattacharya, & Korschun, 2006). Both should 
be involved into strategic prioritization of CSR activities.
Although the European perception of CSR is strongly influenced by the 
normative research stream, with the state as a strong regulator, our results 
confirm the notion that strong government regulations might not be neces-
sary (Friedman, 1962). The assumption of the strong role of government 
(Campbell, 2007) does not hold true in our study; government has the weak-
est weight in the pressure from primary stakeholders construct.
Our finding that secondary stakeholders influence primary stakeholders 
but do not directly have an impact on CSR implementation offers theoretical 
implications as well as practical insights. First, this finding goes in line with 
the proposition based on resource dependence theory that stakeholders in 
relationships with low interdependence will choose an indirectly influencing 
strategy (Frooman, 1999). At the same time, the proposition based on institu-
tional theory that CSR implementation will be directly influenced by NGOs 
and social movement organizations does not hold true (Campbell, 2007). 
Instead, companies must be aware of the (indirectly) influential power of 
media and NGOs (Doh & Teegen, 2002). If consumers did not consider sus-
tainability important, Greenpeace’s Amazonian leather report would likely 
not have caused the shoe companies to alter their CSR implementation. To be 
aware of this relationship might help managers to decide on how to deal with 
convergent claims of NGOs. For instance, stakeholder dialogue should only 
be stressed with those NGOs that are most relevant for primary stakeholders. 
For NGOs in turn, these findings also provide a sound argument for corporate 
fundraising efforts or joint ventures (Harrison & John, 1996). For instance, to 
turn from stakeseekers to stakeholders, they should consider a company’s 
employees, investors, and costumers as gatekeepers to legitimacy.
With respect to media, the notion of “influencers” rather than stakeholders 
is supported as well (Donaldson & Preston, 1995, p. 86). The agenda setting 
function for CSR-related issues will only work if primary stakeholders can be 
motivated to exert pressure.
The same holds true for competitive pressure on CSR implementation. 
Only those CSR activities undertaken by competitors will have a “peer pres-
sure” (Campbell, 2006, p. 935) effect on a company’s CSR implementation, 
which are considered as necessary by primary stakeholders.
In the second part of the model, we also find that the level of CSR imple-
mentation affects market performance positively rather than harming 
business results. This competitive advantage can be explained by certain 
intangible resources (“technology, human resources, reputation, and culture 
developing”; Surroca, Tribó, & Waddock, 2010, p. 467) firms fostering 
close relationships 
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with primary stakeholders are able to develop. Market dynamism moderates 
this impact, which implies that companies in turbulent environments should 
place even more emphasis on CSR implementation to guarantee or enhance 
their performance. This recommendation may hold especially true in economic 
crises, when churn among employees and customers is high and NGOs and 
media highlight irresponsible business behaviors.
The results reject the idea that CSR is inconsistent with shareholder wealth 
maximization. Thus, our analysis considers organizational effectiveness a 
broad concept that encompasses both financial and social performance 
(Judge, 1994). For managers, our results suggest they should not try to avoid 
or react to stakeholder pressure but rather should behave proactively to 
implement CSR (Murray & Vogel, 1997) to meet stakeholders’ expectations 
and achieve better market performance (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001).
Finally, the authors note the shift from implicit to explicit CSR in Europe 
(Doh & Guay, 2006; Matten & Moon, 2008); 38.9% of the companies in our 
sample stated, “In our company, we use CSR in order to attempt to create a 
sustainable company which shall be an ongoing concern over the long run,” 
whereas only 13% perceive CSR “as a duty to society and a social obligation; 
therefore CSR expenditures are seen simply as costs.” With respect to the 
degree of CSR implementation, most sample companies exhibit an above-
average level. We divided the sample in quartiles, according to index values 
(from 20 to 132), such that 47 fall between 105 and 132, 92 are between 77 
and 104, 47 score between 49 and 76, and 10 earn scores of 20 and 48.
Limitations and Further Research
This study attempts to illuminate the research gap pertaining to the influence 
of stakeholder pressure on CSR implementation and market performance. 
Several questions remain unanswered.
This study is limited by its retrospective nature (Barnett & Salomon, 2006) 
and possibly by an endogeneity bias in the form of a reverse causal relation-
ship, which could be overcome by conducting a natural experiment 
(Kacperczyk, 2009). However, for our main research contribution, a survey 
of key informants is acceptable. The generalizability and external validity of 
our results might be limited by our small sample and focus on Europe. 
However, in addition to providing theoretical implications for stakeholder 
theory, we consider country studies important for global economies.
Further research could enlarge the range of stakeholders involved to unions, 
consumer organizations, the general public, and so on, and could also add 
power, legitimacy, and urgency as stakeholder attributes to the 
relationship 
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between stakeholder pressure and CSR implementation (Agle et al., 1999; 
Mitchell et al., 1997). In addition, objective measures of CSR implementation 
could be employed using surveys of consumers, employees, and public stake-
holders or the amount of philanthropic donations (Maignan et al., 1999). The 
authors also recommend improvements to the scale of the moderating construct 
of market dynamism, which could be operationalized as stakeholder market 
dynamism with a focus on turbulence among donors, NGOs, media, and so on. 
relying on quantifiable indicators (comparable to Dess & Beard, 1984). Finally, 
the positive link between CSR implementation and market performance reflect 
social norms (Gond & Palazzo, 2008), so further research should investigate 
ethical codes and their influence on CSR implementation.
Appendix
Table A1. Descriptive statistics and quality criteria (primary stakeholders).
Construct/items M (SD)
Factor 
loading
Cronbach’s 
alpha
Composite 
reliability
Average 
variance 
extracted, %
Pressure from primary stakeholders .87 .92 79.88
 Employees
Our employees voluntarily 
engage in corporate social 
responsibility activities of 
the firm.
4.20 (1.62) 0.90
Our employees expect the 
firm to implement CSR 
activities.
4.28 (1.55) 0.92
Our employees monitor 
whether the promises 
concerning CSR are fulfilled.
3.80 (1.55) 0.86
 Customers/investors .74 .83 54.84
Investors expand into the 
market of corporate social 
investments.
3.42 (1.49) 0.73
Social and/or ecological 
aspects of investments are 
important for our investors.
4.08 (1.60) 0.74
Our customers’ purchasing 
habits are changing to 
support responsible 
corporations (e.g., fair trade 
coffee).
3.69 (1.55) 0.83
Our customers are ready 
to boycott products 
and services which do 
not comply with social 
standards.
3.20 (1.35) 0.70
(continued)
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Construct/items M (SD)
Factor 
loading
Cronbach’s 
alpha
Composite 
reliability
Average 
variance 
extracted, %
 Government/regulators .70 .84 63.74
Governments force initiatives 
to increase transparency in 
our business.
4.15 (1.74) 0.80
Governments pass laws to 
increase transparency in our 
sector.
4.29 (1.65) 0.80
Governments try to initiate 
CSR activities of companies.
3.20 (1.35) 0.74
Table A1 (continued)
Table A2. Descriptive statistics and quality criteria (secondary stakeholders).
Construct/items M (SD)
Factor 
loading
Cronbach’s 
alpha
Composite 
reliability
Average 
variance 
extracted, %
Pressure from secondary stakeholders
 Media .91 .94 79.96
Our company often 
appears in the media 
headlines.
3.42 (1.99) 0.90
We are strongly 
represented in the 
media.
3.48 (1.95) 0.93
Our company’s activities 
are closely monitored 
by the media.
3.33 (1.94) 0.92
Various media portray 
our management 
board’s activities.
2.88 (1.72) 0.83
 NGOs/activists .72 .85 74.17
NGOs tend to be 
more willing to 
negotiate with 
our firm.
3.23 (1.61) 0.74 
(before 
elimination: 
0.68)
We have to cope with 
NGOs campaigning 
against our firm/our 
products and services.
2.08 (1.55) 0.45ab
We foster partnerships 
with NGOs relevant 
for our company.
3.27 (1.79) 0.77
aFactor loading less than the required level of 0.7. bItem eliminated from further analysis.
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Table A3. Descriptive statistics and quality criteria (competitors).
Construct/items M (SD)
Factor 
loading
Cronbach’s 
alpha
Composite 
reliability
Average 
variance 
extracted, %
Competitive corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) 
implementation pressure  
.88 .92 73.72
Our strongest 
competitors take a 
leading role in CSR.
2.57 (1.40) 0.88
Our strongest 
competitors are known 
for their transparent 
communication policies.
2.78 (1.32) 0.80
Our strongest 
competitors 
communicate openly 
about their corporate 
social responsibility 
activities.
2.82 (1.34) 0.89
Our strongest 
competitors invest 
regularly in social funds 
and projects.
2.76 (1.33) 0.86
Table A4. Descriptive statistics (corporate social responsibility [CSR] 
implementation).
Construct/items M (SD)
Philanthropic responsibilites
Our top management ensures a coherent corporate citizenship 
approach integrated into the corporate strategy.
4.84 (1.50)
The top management strongly encourages our employees to 
actively participate in CSR initiatives.
4.13 (1.60)
We encourage partnerships with local businesses and schools. 4.57 (1.67)
Our company gives adequate contributions to charities. 4.57 (1.75)
A program is in place to reduce the amount of energy and 
materials wasted in our company.
5.21 (1.72)
Our company supports employees who acquire additional 
education.
5.92 (1.19)
Flexible company policies enable our employees to reconcile 
work and private life.
5.22 (1.36)
(continued)
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Construct/items M (SD)
Ethical responsibilites
Our top management reports in accordance with international 
reporting standards (e.g., Global Reporting Initiative [GRI]).
4.18 (2.18)
The management fosters industry collaboration to meet social 
concerns.
4.14 (1.63)
The management fosters stakeholder dialogues on CSR. 3.91 (1.73)
Our company has a comprehensive code of conduct. 5.30 (1.68)
A confidential procedure is in place for our employees to report 
any misconduct at work.
4.51 (2.07)
Fairness toward coworkers and business partners is an integral 
part of the employee evaluation process.
5.57 (1.40)
We monitor potential negative impacts of our activities on the 
community.
4.95 (1.57)
Legal responsibilites
We have programs that encourage diversity in our workforce 
(e.g., age, sex, handicapped).
4.14 (1.82)
Internal policies prevent discrimination in our employees’ 
compensation and promotion.
5.42 (1.57)
We defined internal standards/policies for situations and contexts 
not regulated explicitly by current law (e.g., bribery).
5.13 (1.81)
We provide goods and services that go far beyond minimal legal 
requirements (e.g., product security).
5.40 (1.47)
Economic responsibilites
We continually strive to improve the quality of our products. 6.21 (1.04)
We strive to lower our operating costs. 5.81 (1.28)
We have a standardized procedure in place to respond to every 
customer complaint.
5.79 (1.36)
We closely monitor employee productivity. 5.32 (1.26)
Table A4 (continued)
Table A5. Descriptive statistics and quality criteria (market performance).
Construct/items M (SD)
Factor 
loading
Cronbach’s 
alpha
Composite 
reliability
Average 
variance 
extracted, %
Market performance .88 .91 59.04
Compared to your competitors, 
how has your organization, over 
the last 3 years, performed with 
respect to . . . ?
. . . achieving 
customer 
satisfaction.
5.65 (0.94) 0.76
(continued)
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Table A6. Descriptive statistics and quality criteria (market dynamism).
Construct/items M (SD) Factor loading
Cronbach’s 
alpha
Composite 
reliability
Average 
variance 
extracted, %
Market dynamism .80 (before 
elimination: 
.86)
.86 (before 
elimination: 
.72)
68.39 (before 
elimination: 
37.90)
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:
In our kind 
of business, 
customers’ product 
preferences change 
quickly.
3.59 (1.74) 0.78 (before 
elimination: 
0.69a)
Our customers tend 
to look for new 
products all the 
time.
4.13 (1.77) 0.97 (before 
elimination: 
0.91)
(continued)
Construct/items M (SD)
Factor 
loading
Cronbach’s 
alpha
Composite 
reliability
Average 
variance 
extracted, %
. . . providing 
value for 
customers.
5.79 (0.91) 0.77
. . . attaining 
desired growth.
5.41 (1.38) 0.75
 . . . securing 
desired market 
share.
5.19 (1.40) 0.81
. . . successfully 
introducing new 
products.
5.31 (1.35) 0.75
. . . keeping 
current 
customers.
5.90 (1.09) 0.77
. . . attracting 
new customers.
5.32 (1.34) 0.75
Table A5 (continued)
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Construct/items M (SD) Factor loading
Cronbach’s 
alpha
Composite 
reliability
Average 
variance 
extracted, %
New customers 
tend to have 
product-related 
needs that are 
different from 
those of our 
existing customers.
3.70 (1.68) 0.71 (before 
elimination: 
0.63a)
We frequently 
face changes 
in products 
offered by our 
competitors.
3.58 (1.61) 0.32a,b
We frequently face 
changes in sales 
strategies of our 
competitors.
3.60 (1.45) 0.30a,b
aFactor loading less than the required level of 0.7.
bItem eliminated from further analysis.
Table A6 (continued)
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Notes
1. This concept takes multiple names; the authors use the core term CSR herein,
because it remains the most common in theory and practice (Edward & Willmott,
2008; Palazzo & Scherer, 2008).
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2. The distribution of industry types in the sample is generally representative of
Western European countries: manufacturing 30.2%, finance and insurance 22.2%,
wholesale trade 10.1%, transportation and warehousing 9.5%, retail trade 5.8%,
utilities 5.3%, and construction 4.2%.
3. The respondents (88.3% men, 7.7% women, 4.1% no response) were mostly
chief executives or operating officers, managing directors, heads of strategic
business units, or marketing managers. The authors assessed their position in the
company, duration in that position, and tenure with the company to measure their 
key informant competency (Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993; Lichtenthaler,
2009).
4. Other than Jaworski and Kohli (1993) who reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .68,
no prior studies provide information about the construct reliability of this scale
(Homburg & Pflesser, 2000; Maltz & Kohli, 1996). The present authors recognize
item elimination as part of a scale development process.
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